A Counterfactual Comparison of Spain and Sweden
In hindsight, history often looks self-evident. Explaining different national trajectories during the 20 th century in Europe, we usually take the peaceful and largely harmonious development of the Nordic countries for granted while seeing the brutal and bloody development of Spain as more or less a "natural" outcome of its historically inherited social and economic structure. In this article, we take a different view, inspired by the counterfactual approach to political events and combining this with the comparative case study method (Kiser and Levi 1996) .
The counterfactual approach rests on searching after factors that never did occur but could have existed in a stream of events that led to a certain outcome. Since such counterfactuals can not be found in any archives or historical documents, the researcher in this approach needs a theory or a model that "will enable him to deduce a counterfactual situation from institutions and relationships that actually existed" (Fogel 1964, p. 224.) In this admittedly speculative approach, researchers have to justify their claim that the outcome of the historical process could have been different by presenting arguments for how and why things could have developed in a different way. Such arguments rest on making it plausible that if the postulated variable had taken on some "value different from the one that is assumed in the actual world," (Tetlock and Belkin 1996, p. 6) , the outcome would have been different. The relevance of this approach thus hinges on making such counterfactuals plausible. This is where the comparative case study approach enters the picture. The logic is that if it is possible to find a case B with a different outcome than case A, but for which it is not unreasonable or implausible to state that at the beginning of the process, case B had many features resembling case A, the hypothetical existence of a counterfactual can be made plausible. For example, it makes little sense to argue that if Napoleon would have had nuclear weapons at Waterloo, he would not have been defeated. However, using the comparative case method, one could argue that if he would have used the same military tactics as he did at Austerlitz, or as the Carthage army did at Cannae, Napoleon would have won at Waterloo. Since this (maybe) would have been within the reach of his command, this is a more justifiable counterfactual approach. As this simple example shows, the task for the researchers in the counterfactual approach is then to show that a) 3 this other tactic could have been used and b) if it had been, the outcome would in all likelihood been different. The comparative case method increases the probability that the researcher will come across counterfactuals that are not obvious if one concentrates on the single case. The counterfactual approach is thus a way to come to grasp with historical explanations that are over-determined by structural factors and that do not give any room for explanations that points at, for example, the strategic choices made by agents or how they operate to change existing or create new institutional settings.
Interwar Europe was a time with intense political conflicts and dramatic clashes between the left and the right. However, the result of these confrontations varied dramatically from the establishment of Leninist and then Stalinist communism in Russia, Fascism in Austria, Germany and Italy, civil war in Spain and peaceful reconciliation between organized labour, the farmers' movement and capital in the Scandinavian countries. The year when the Spanish war started, 1936, was also the year when the famous Saltsjöbaden Accord was signed between the Swedish Trade Union movement and the Swedish Employers' federation which became the backbone for the country's uniquely long period of peaceful and productive collaboration between the parties on the labour market and the state. Thus in this year, while Sweden was giving birth to the probably most admired solution to the class-based type of social conflict worldwide (the Neo-Corporatist Welfare State), Spain gave birth to the most despised one (Civil War).
By comparing these two extreme cases using the counterfactual approach we hope to shed light on factors that have not been obvious in the many analyses -mostly, casestudies -that have sought to explain these different countries' historical trajectories. In particular, our interest is if such a comparison would make it possible to find out some variable (i.e, the counterfactuals) that may have been neglected in explaining the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (SCW). Even if the SCW probably has provoked more books than any other civil war (Beevor 2002: 7) , numerous questions remain open to debate.
Many of them have of course been (and still are) subject to ideologically charged controversies (Stradling 2008 , Payne 2006 . The central dilemma in the debate is why Spain, a semi-prosperous parliamentary democracy, entered in such a spiral of political radicalization conductive to some of the most horrendous episodes of violence, by both leftish and rightist extremists, in the history of Western countries?
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While the literature has extensively emphasized all the usual suspects as determinants of the SCW -e.g. the international system and the influence of foreign powers; the acute socio-economic, ethno-linguistic or religious cleavages; and the weak democratic or liberal tradition -, the characteristics of the Spanish state and its bureaucracy have mostly been overlooked. To start with, by Spanish administrative scholars themselves, who have tended to regard the Spanish bureaucracy during the Republic as a "quite pond" in a tumultuous environment (Nieto 1976, p.567) . The goal of this paper is to underline the importance of two interconnected characteristics of the Spanish bureaucratic state for explaining the collapse of the democratic Republic: the lack of rule of law based on the concept of impartiality and the extensive patronage in personnel policies.
In doing so, we also depart from the traditional approach to the SCW -mostly based on a single case-study methodology. We adopt instead a more comparative perspective, selecting according to the main relevant independent variable (i.e. the bureaucratic structure). As a consequence, we explore the different approach to politics of the state and the rule of law in two countries, Sweden and Spain, which, on the one hand, experienced similar levels of social conflict but, on the other, had inherited very different bureaucratic structures and perspectives on the importance of the rule of law. In the second half of the 19 th century, the semi-authoritarian Swedish state -where executive and administrative positions, firmly in hands of the Crown, were not controlled by the parliament -created and consolidated a meritocratic autonomous bureaucracy which was centered on the respect for impartiality and the rule of law (Rothstein 1998 The clearest case would be the gruesome civil war that took place in Finland in 1918 between "reds" and "whites". This war, in which many Swedish speaking Finns took part specially at high levels of command, contained horrible atrocities against unarmed civilians, summary mass executions of enemy combatants, interference from outside military forces and the use of concentration camps in which after the war had ended the winning side let thousands of soldiers and civilians from the losing side starve to death (Roselius 2009; Ylikangas 1995) . According to recent estimations, more than one percent of the total Finish population lost their lives in the 1918 civil war. This makes the Finish conflict, if any, even more dramatic than the Spanish one since, despite a very similar proportion of population died, Spain lost those lives over a period of three years, not three months (Ylikangas 1998 It can be argued that, in retrospect, it is easy to state that the armed solution produced the worst outcome for (almost) all relevant social and political forces, but that, Catalunya in which they showed their willingness to reach broad labor-capital compromise. They were ready to accept most points of the leftist Popular Front's governmental economic program, including some of the most controversial labor regulations. It is important to bear in mind that the minister of industry, Plácido Álvarez-Buylla, had clearly stated the government had the "educational" responsibility to change the terms of industrial relations (Cabrera 1983 , Payne 2006 . In exchange, employers' organizations asked the government to pass elemental measures to keep a basic capitalist activity while economic interactions were subject to constant disruption. They, like many government officials, were conscious that capital was fleeing the country as a result of constant violations of property rights and the rule of law. Nevertheless, these were What affected the decisions of hundreds of key rank-and-file officers was the flagrant violation of the rule of law embodied by the fact that it was representatives of the Republican public forces the ones who had committed the assassination of the opposition leader. For Captain Pérez Salas, "after the details were revealed and it was learned that the forces of public order had themselves been involved, the reaction was tremendous…It is futile to try to deny the importance of this fact. If the forces of public order, on whom the rights and security of citizens depend, are capable of carrying out this kind of act, they effectively demonstrate their lack of discipline and obliviousness to the sacred mission" (ibid). It is at this point, and not earlier, when a large number of military officials reached the conclusion that it was more dangerous not to rebel than to rebel.
If the capitalist classes, far from an early support for a "fascist" solution, an
showed until the very last minute an approach at least as conciliatory as other European Nevertheless, following the general radicalization of the left forces, both the anarcho-syndicalist union CNT and the socialist union UGT refused to participate in the reformed arbitration committees. This rejection unbalanced these jurados that in other countries had become cornerstones to transform the social actors' perceptions of the labor-capital conflict from a zero-sum game into a positive-sum game. It would also be premature to assign the reluctance of the unions to compromise to their historical unconciliatory approach. That may be true for the anarcho-syndicalist CNT who, nonetheless, had seen its membership shrinking from one to half million in a few years.
Yet this cannot be argued of the Socialist UGT who presented a long history of collaborationist attitude in comparative perspective -including under Primo de Rivera's (1923 Rivera's ( -1930 In sum, the Spanish bourgeois exhibited willingness to advance towards compromise with organized labor, although this inclination has tended to be overlooked for long by scholars -probably as a result of the lack of comparative edge in most analyses. Case-study methodology, the overwhelmingly prevalent in the studies of the SCW, is prone to emphasize the dynamics that directly led to the civil war (e.g. rightwing support to the military conspiracy) and overlook the dynamics that could have led to peace (e.g. right-wing support to social compromise). In other words, they embody what some regard as one of the main pathologies of social science: the focus on the things that went wrong or "misery research" (Rothstein 1998, p. 62) .
Wby Madrid became Moscow and not Stockholm?
This Some landowners associations, in many cases expressing unequivocal commitment to the Republican values, argued that the cost of harvest would exceed its value (Payne 2006, p. 263 ). Yet their claims were ignored by the government.
As a result, there was a widespread flight of many landowners from the countryside. However, instead of take into account landowners' complaints, the reaction of In his detailed account on the collapse of the Spanish Republic, Payne (2006) emphasizes that middle classes were one of the social groups who suffered the most the Frente Popular government that emerged from the February 1936 elections. Its major aim, according to Prime Minister Casares Quiroga in his inaugural speech in the parliament, would be "an all-out attack" against the "enemies" (of the Republic), who would eventually be "crushed". The government would promote the politicization of justice and he added that "when it has to do with fascism, I will be unable to remain impartial. I declare to you that this government is belligerent against fascism" (Payne 2006, p. 248) . In a country where the official fascist party represented 0.5 percent of the electorate, it was obvious that the governmental classification of fascist could be arbitrarily extended to cover any social collective considered as dangeous. The religious middle-classes would become soon a main target. The minister of public instruction in Casares Quiroga's government, Francisco Barnés, made of the closure of the religious congregations' schools and of the illegal confiscation of private schools an official policy (Robinson 1970, p. 226) . Not only priests, but also churchgoers were harassed and "were made to feel that it was unsafe to attend Mass" (Malefakis 1970, p. 374) . Additionally, higher civil servants, such as judges and prosecutors, were forced to retire in a straight attack against the rule of law (Payne 2006; 252) . Economically, the ambitious expansion of major budget categories (at a time in which public debt was skyrocketing) set by the 
The Quality of Government Factor and the outbreak of Civil Wars
This paper does not aim to answer all these puzzling behaviours among the Spanish
Republican political elite, among other reasons because one cannot disregard the importance of irrational motivations in many politicians or, to the say the least, of an "extremely bounded" rationality in a large number of them. 5 Nevertheless, this paper argues here that institutional factors can be more convincing than psychological ones in this case, since the willingness to curb the rule of law to remain in power -at the risk of the ignition of a civil war -cut across all the Spanish political elite, unlike what happened in the relatively similar Sweden.
There seems to be a systematic pattern in the way politicians who "touched power" behaved in office and we argue that this could have had a decisive role in transforming the Spain's social conflicts into a violent confrontation. Republican incumbents seemed to give an overwhelming preference to party interests over basic respect for the rule of law and, in particularly, they seemed to prioritize the implementation of policies that maximized the delivery of targeted clientelistic policies and the occupation of all sort of positions in the entire state politico-administrative apparatus. Unlike their European counterparts, the access to power gave Spanish incumbents access also to a long list of administrative positions to fill with party zealots, 5 In particular, the probably most powerful and charismatic figure during the Republic, Azaña, exhibited frequently such a degree of blindness to basic empirical evidence that it is almost impossible not to give partial credit to explanations based on his megalomaniac personality traits for the demise of Republican institutions. For example, he was frequently recalled that if no significant shift of policy was undertaken, uncontrollable violent leftish revolution and/or an equally violent military uprising would be the most likely outcome in just a few months. Socialist newspapers, like Claridad, regularly reminded him of his role as a "Spanish Kerenski". One major reason for this Azaña's apparently naïve behaviour would lie in a personality defined by fellow ministers at the time, like Miguel Maura, as "pitiless in his judgements of others and their actions (Maura 1968, p. 223 ) and by recent scholars as "aloof, acerbic and arrogant" (Payne 2006, p. 15 We also follow here a recent trend in the research on the outbreak of civil wars.
Generally speaking, one can detect a shift in focus in the comparative literature on the causes of civil conflicts: the emphasis has moved from socio-economic charateristics to the characteristics of the state (Fearon and Laitin 2003 , Collier 2009 , Öberg and Melander 2009 , Rothstein 2009b . These scholars are pointing at the character of the state as an important reason for why civil wars start in some settings and not in others. The lack of impartiality in the implementation of laws and policies -considered in the literature as the defining element of "quality of government" (Rothstein & Teorell (2008) -is seen as a major factor for explaining civil wars.
For example, in his analysis of the outbreak of the Civil War in former Yugoslavia, Rothstein shows that the Serb minority in the then newly created Croatian state initially accepted their role as a minority given that their civil rights would be respected by the new government. The radicalization of the Serb minority in Croatia that escalated into violence and the following civil war, took place as a response to a set of major violations of the principles of the rule-of-law, of equal protection under the law and respect for the minority rights that the Serb minority interpreted as real threats to their lives and their possibility to coexist in the new Croatian state. The argument is that it is not being outvoted in elections that will destroy the legitimacy of the political order in the eyes of the losing minority. Instead, it is if they have reason to fear that the winning side will use their powers to destroy the state impartiality in its exercise of power. If belonging to minority not only implies that your influence of the enactment of new policies will be very low, but if it also implies you can not count on being protected by the police, on be given an equal chance to apply for public contracts and government jobs or on getting a fair and impartial treatment by courts and other public authorities that your livelihood depends on, then legitimacy breaks down and the result may be civil strife that can escalate to full blown civil war (Rothstein 2009 ).
According to Payne (2004 Payne ( , 2006 , as well as Beevor (2009) 
Swedish Bureaucratic Autonomy versus Spanish Politicization
We argue here that 1930s Sweden, where political incumbents (e.g. Socialist SAP ministers) were unable to replace at will public employees down in the chain of command, would neatly fit as well in the category of powerful administration as defined by Greif (2007) . [1908] [1909] [1910] [1911] [1912] [1913] [1914] [1915] [1916] [1917] , the Swedish administrative state was already in hands of a coalition of autonomous bureaucrats with the technical skills and the cohesion to resist attempts of politicization. Interestingly, Swedish bureaucrats did not enter the political game and, since then, they have been both formally and informally precluded to take part in active politics. Hence it is not only that politicians did not occupy administrative positions, but bureaucrats could not become politicians either. This is in sharp contrast with Spain where bureaucrats not only could engage in active politics, but they became leading figures in several parties.
In historical comparative terms, Sweden presents one of the most clear-cut separations of politics and administration (Dahlstrom & Lapuente 2009 , 2010 . In the first place, there is hardly "politicization from above" -that is, politicians do not occupy positions reserved to bureaucrats. Secondly, the level of "politicization from below" -that is, bureaucrats having themselves a political career and eventually becoming party leaders -has also been very low. In sharp contrast, Spain represents, in comparative terms, one of the Western examples with a higher degree of integration of politics and administration. Not only there have traditionally been a large numbers of the administrative layers of the state apparatus occupied by political appointees (politicization from above), but it is also remarkable the extremely high proportion of civil servants among the elites of major political parties (politicization from below).
The unions and the Swedish Social Democratic party came to appreciate and make use of the states' impartiality during this crucial period (Rothstein 1992 , Rothstein 2005 . By taking part on an equal footing with the employers' federation in various corporatist boards an agencies organized by the state, the non-communist left came to realize the value of this system for their own political interests. Starting already in 1903, numerous such corporatist bodies dealing with issues such as the implementation of social insurance schemes, work safety regulations, mediations in industrial disputes and the operation of local labour exchanges were established (Rothstein 1992 (Rothstein , 2005 . The strength of the meritocratic and rule-of-law oriented bureaucracy was also increased because of the self-interest and "corps-de-esprit" of the bureaucrats themselves. This group certainly had a vested interest in the state to remain impartial given that their future professional careers (which excluded the possibility of engaging in active politics) depended on that.
In the increasingly politicized years of the interwar Europe, the Swedish civil service was thus able to remain as an impartial or neutral power "above politics", using the term coined by Miller (2000) . On the contrary, in Spain the continuity of the "spoils system" until at least the enactment of the 1918 Civil Service Act (Jiménez-Asensio 1989: 253) , that is, long after the establishment of the male universal suffrage (1890), together with the high fragmentation of the relatively few merit-based administrative bodies made the Spanish state permeable to extensive politicization. The politicallyappointed (or non-cohesive merit-recruited) public employees, especially those in the state security apparatus, had a vested interest not in keeping impartiality, but in providing policies as "partial" as possible. In other words, the Spanish state, or at least very significant bits of it, remained not above, but "under politics". where Canovas del Castillo crafted a peaceful system of alternating control through which his Conservative party and the Liberals could rotate in power thanks to a tacit acceptation of electoral manipulation. This alternation was called the turno pacifico and it has been often praised for achieving its goal of replacing the military coup as the main instrument of political change in Spain (Carr 1980, p.8) and in general for bringing stability to Spain (Payne 2006) . Its pernicious consequences in terms of state building have in turn been clearly overlooked.
The universal male suffrage was introduced in 1890, but the overall government control over the electoral results from above did not disappear. The electoral manipulation was done through, first, the Civil Governors of each province and, second, the caciques or local political bosses, employed by each of the two parties in order to secure for itself a comfortable majority in the Cortes. These figures created their clienteles by delivering jobs in the public sector. Backed by the civil governors, caciques handed out all type of jobs within a given territory: from night watchman to judge (Carr, 1980, p11) . To do this the cacique had a total control over municipalities and judgeships and it was essential that every electoral contest was preceded by a massive change of 27 mayors and local judges. The electoral manipulation was so high that the electoral results were at some point published in the press before polling day (Carr 1980, p.12 ).
All throughout the 19 th century therefore employees' asset which was most required by governments was "electoral loyalty to a party", in particular to a certain stream within the party, and very especially to some political bosses (Nieto 1996, p390-1) . Civil servants were mostly considered as an 'impact force' of the government party.
In order to show they were complying and not shirking, and in order to intimidate voters of opposition parties, civil servants used to vote in groups and sometimes to decorate their uniforms to make their electoral choice more evident (Parrado 2000:252; Jimenez Asensio 1989:155; Varela Ortega 1977:415) . In the second place, their function was to mobilize friends and relatives to vote -the possession of a large family able to vote being the main asset for a civil servant. 8 The Count of Romanones, who was 17 times minister and 3 times Prime Minister, openly recognized that the elections were not won by providing public policies for the citizenry, but by offering jobs and having friends (Romanones 1934:71) .
A key administrative position in the partial behavior of governments during the Republic was, as we have seen, the Civil Governors in each province. The Minister of the Interior Javier de Burgos created in 1830 the Spanish provincias which would be the equivalent of the French administrative territorial division (department). To head the provincias Javier de Burgos set up a new administrative officer -the subdelegado de gobierno (soon latter renamed as Civil Governor)-who would play the same role as the French prefect. But while the latter had a professional profile and soon achieved bureaucratic autonomy from politicians, the Spanish gobernador civil, on the contrary, was subject to the general spoils system existing in the administration. Contrary to the technocratic profile of the French prefects, who belonged to the prestigious prefectural corps, the primary -and sometimes unique -function of the gobernador civil was "to milk votes" (Garcia de Enterria 1961:55) . Had a Spanish prefectural corps been installed in the 1830s, it would, to the very least, have been difficult to imagine some the most evident abuses of the rule of law in 1936, tolerated, if not directly encouraged by Thus, the PSOE and the rest of the Republican forces had little reason to believe that, when in power, their political opponents would respect universalism, impartiality and the rule of law principles so why should they? In contrast, the Swedish state had been dominated by a largely uncorrupt and "enlightened" civil service corps adhering to
Weberian ideals since the mid 19 th century (Rothstein 1998) . As a matter of fact, the politicization of the public administration was put on the agenda of the Republic even before the democratic institutions were fully operating. So, the provisional government who seized power after the departure of the king in 1931 issued the Act for the Defense of the Republic, which already in its first article partially suppressed secure tenure for those civil servants who showed "lack of zeal and negligence". 10 The Act was deliberately ambiguous to give wide margin of maneuver to politicians to judge on caseby-case bases (Jiménez-Asensio 1989:312) . Despite there are no written records of dismissals, and therefore we lack solid evidence on whether this Act was really implemented (Ballvé 1983:329; Jiménez-Asensio 1989:312) , the politicization of the administration, specially regarding the civil governorships and the security forces was extremely acute (Payne 2006) .
Democracy and State Building -the Importance of Sequencing
Following Shefter's (1977) thesis on the emergence of bureaucracies, in 19 th century Sweden, the moment of mass politics came after the consolidation of a coalition for bureaucratic autonomy and the establishment of a Weberian state. The socialist party was "externally mobilized" in Sweden since it had to grow within the boundaries of an authoritarian regime, that is, in regimes where there were no opportunities for the party to become a member of the government. The implication is that the Swedish party (like the German and Austrian socialist parties) could not resort to a patron-client pattern of exchange with their supporters. They could not tell their would-be militants: we will offer you a public job. This meant that the Swedish type of socialist party had to offer a programmatic strategy built on a combination of socialist ideas and the protection of workers' and unions' interests instead of patronage jobs and clientelistic policies. In sum, during the second half of the 19 th century, the preservation of a mostly unaccountable to politicians state administration allowed the creation of a coalition for bureaucratic autonomy formed by increasingly meritocratic civil servants in Sweden.
This coalition was able to keep the impartiality of the Swedish state in the decades to come. On the contrary, the existence of a state administration highly accountable to politicians in Spain during the 19 th century prevented the formation of a coalition of meritocratic autonomous bureaucrats who could have resisted the attempts of politicization and who could have also played a mediation role in the social conflicts of the interwar period. In sum, in 1936 Spain was not, comparatively speaking, lacking governmental capacity. Quite the opposite, the Spanish executives had too much governmental capacity in the sense that they was not counter-balanced by a strong body or bodies of administrators who could prevent the politicization (of personnel and policies) and the increasing curbing of the rule of law.
